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ARGUMENT 
I. THE NUMEROUS PROCEDURAL ISSUES RAISED BY DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES ARE NOT BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Much of the Response Brief is irrelevant, raising extraneous procedural 
issues that are not part of this appeal. For example: 
• Defendants assert that GLFP's summary judgment 
oppositions did not comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B). 
Br. at 13. While not following the format of that 
Rule, the oppositions clearly controverted a 
number of Defendants' factual assertions (and 
more importantly, the legal significance of those 
assertions). See, e.g., R. at 255-56; 265-66. The 
trial court made no mention of Rule 7(c)(3)(B), 
and specifically found disputed issues of fact 
regarding Defendants' assignment argument. R. at 
434. 
• Defendants raise the assignment issue (sometimes 
referring to it as a question of standing), Br. at 6 
n.l, 7, 12, even though they did not file a cross-
appeal and the district court ruled against them on 
this aspect of their summary judgment motion. 
R. at 434. GLFP presented extensive evidence 
below that the assignment was not effective and, 
alternatively, that Defendants were estopped from 
asserting the assignment. R. at 314-316; 317-320. 
Given the district court's ruling and the lack of a 
cross-appeal, this question is simply not before this 
Court. 
• Defendants argue that GLFP's complaint was not 
verified under Rule 23.1. Defendants did not make 
this argument in its summary judgment motions 
below and, in any event, GLFP's initial complaint 
was not submitted pursuant to Rule 23.1. After the 
district court held that GLFP's claims were 
derivative, GLFP filed a motion to amend the 
complaint. The trial court denied that motion so 
GLFP was not allowed to file an amended 
complaint, verified or otherwise. 
• Defendants argue that GLFP's motion to 
reconsider was improper under Gillette v. Price, 
135 P.3d 861 (Utah 2006). Gillettte was decided 
in April of this year, while the motion to 
reconsider was filed in November 2005. R. at 467. 
Gillette specifically indicated that its holding was 
to be applied prospectively. 2006 UT 24, U 8, 135 
P.3d at 863. Moreover, the holding is intended to 
clarify when judgment is final for purposes of 
calculating the time to file an appeal. Id. Here, the 
trial court issued its summary judgment decision, 
but did not enter a final judgment thereon. R. at 
436. Thus, GLFP's motion to reconsider had no 
impact on the timing of appeal in this case. 
• Defendants also argue that GLFP submitted 
inadmissible "settlement documents" in support of 
its motion to amend to allege futility of demand. 
Br. at 32 n. 7. Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence did not preclude GLFP's use of these 
documents. They were submitted not to prove 
liability, but to demonstrate that the parties had 
previously attempted to resolve GLFP's claims -
without success - and that futility of demand was 
apparent. Rule 408 does not preclude submission 
of "settlement negotiations" under these 
circumstances. 
• Finally, Defendants argue that GLFP failed to 
name all the required parties for its dissolution 
claims against CL Mgmt and CL Properties. They 
fail to note that these entities are also owned by the 
Clarks and Learnings, such that adding them does 
not bring any new interests to the case. Moreover, 
Defendants did not raise this issue below, and 
nothing in the dissolution statute states that all 
general and limited partners are needed in a 
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dissolution proceeding. See Utah Code § 48-2a-
801. None of the cases cited by Defendants so 
hold. And, if additional parties were necessary, 
the remedy is to add those parties, not dismiss the 
case. U.R.C.P. 19(a). 
Ultimately, Defendants argue that "GLFP's complaint is fatally defective on 
many grounds, and the trial court correctly dismissed it pursuant to establish Utah 
law and procedure." Br. at 31. To the contrary, the trial court did not dismiss 
GLFP's complaint because of the procedural defects now alleged by Defendants. 
Instead, it granted summary judgment because of its conclusion that each of 
GLFP's claims was derivative and could not be brought directly. R. at 436. That 
conclusion is the primary issue on appeal, along with GLFP's alternative 
arguments that an exception to the derivative-suit requirements should have been 
applied in this case, and/or that GLFP should have been allowed to pursue the 
claims while asserting futility of demand. These numerous procedural arguments 
are but further attempts to avoid the underlying issue: the Learnings no longer 
want to do business with the Clarks, but have been unable to extricate themselves 
from that abusive relationship. 
II. GLFP's CLAIMS WERE NOT DERIVATIVE. 
Despite its 37 page length, Defendants-Appellees' brief does virtually 
nothing to address GLFP's assertion that the commingling and diversion of assets 
by CL Mgmt -for the benefit of solely Clark-owned entities - constituted direct 
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harm to GLFP. Defendants are so focused on improper fees that they attempt to 
deal with GLFP's primary argument in a mere footnote of their brief. Br. at 23 
n. 4. There, they assert that "A reduction in distributions to a limited partner, 
based upon an alleged harm suffered by the partnership, is the very definition of a 
derivative claim." (Emphasis added.) GLFP never alleged, however, that its 
distributions were reduced because of "an alleged harm suffered by the 
partnership." GLFP's claim was that the Clarks and CL Mgmt were using 
CL Mgmt funds for purposes that benefited only the Clarks, and not GLFP/the 
Learnings, i.e., that directly and uniquely harmed GLFP. GLFP was effectively 
funding - through reduced distributions - various Clark entities managed by 
CL Mgmt. 
The case cited by Defendants, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ramco Holding 
Corp., 938 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Okla. 1996), while superficially similar, is quite 
different when carefully compared to this case. In New York Life, the limited 
partner sued the general partner (here, by comparison, the Clarks as individuals), 
alleging that the general partner was overcharging the limited partnership (here, by 
comparison, CL Mgmt) for services and was wrongfully taking funds from the 
limited partnership. Id. at 757. In contrast, here one limited partner (GLFP), 
alleged that the limited partnership itself was wrongly collecting fees from a 
different limited partnership (also owned by the Clarks and Learnings), and then 
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failing to pass through those fees, instead using them for other purposes. 
CL Mgmt is not the entity harmed by this process - only GLFP was harmed. 
The closely-held, inter-related nature of the various entities is what makes 
the harm unique to GLFP. While the other primary limited partner - HCFP -
might also claim reduced distributions, it had no incentive or likelihood to do so 
when the funds were being used to benefit other Clark entities. Thus, while New 
York Life is similar with respect to the factual allegations made by the plaintiff, it is 
distinguishable because of the foregoing facts and because New York Life did not 
involve closely-held, inter-related family businesses. Instead, it appears that New 
York Life was a limited partner with unrelated business entities. And, New York 
Life is obviously not a closely-held family partnership, nor was it part of such a 
partnership. Further, if this Court were inclined to apply the analysis of New York 
Life, it is another reason why the closely-held exception to derivative claims should 
be invoked in this instance. 
Finally, Defendants respond to GLFP's dissolution/accounting claims by 
simply repeating their arguments about the alleged derivative nature of GLFP's 
claims. They ignore what is inconvenient to their argument, i.e., that GLFP made 
numerous allegations - beyond excess fees - supporting dissolution. See Opening 
Br. at 12-13. Dissolution must be available to allow GLFP and the Learnings to 
extricate themselves from the Clarks. 
5 
III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THE "CLOSELY-HELD" 
EXCEPTION. 
Defendants-Appellees assert that the uclosely-held" exception does not 
apply "as a matter of law" because GLFP did not prove that it applied. Br. at 26. 
This circular logic is not supported by the only case cited by Defendants -Aurora 
Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 
1998). Aurora Credit simply acknowledged the exception and remanded the case 
to the trial court to address other issues. Aurora Credit did not hold that the burden 
was on the plaintiff to prove that a direct action would not prejudice creditors, as 
argued by Defendants. Br. at 27-28. Other courts have held that, in the absence of 
evidence of prejudice to creditors, a direct action is appropriate. See, e.g., Norman 
v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 259 (N.C. App. 2000) 
("Still further, there is no indication in this record that the involved corporations 
are insolvent, or that the rights of corporate creditors are otherwise prejudiced by 
the possibility of an individual recovery in this case."); Caswell v. Jordan, 362 
S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. App. 1987) ("There was no evidence of any creditor in need 
of protection; . . . and since [plaintiff] is the only injured shareholder, there can be 
no prejudice to others not a party to the suit."). That is the situation here - there is 
a lack of evidence of prejudice to creditors. Therefore, the district court erred in 
refusing to allow GLFP to proceed directly against Defendants. 
6 
IV. FUTILITY O F DEMAND WAS CLEAR. 
Finally, Defendants argue that GLFP should not have been allowed to 
amend its complaint to allege futility of demand in light of the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, [^ 17, 134 P.3d 1139 
(Utah 2006). Dansie is clearly distinguishable. First, the company in Dansie was 
not a closely-held corporation. 2006 UT 23, f 17, 134 P.3d at 1145.1 Second, there 
is nothing to indicate that the company's management—to whom demand would 
be directed—was alleged to have engaged in the very misconduct that was the 
subject of the claims. Further, the case cited by Defendants—Whalen v. Connelly, 
593 N.W. 2d 147 (Iowa 1999) - involved a board that was not conflicted. Id. at 
157-58. Here, on the other hand, the Clarks acknowledged their conflict of interest 
through their "offer" to retain an allegedly disinterested party to evaluate the 
claims. Opening Br. at 18-19. Even that offer is suspect, however, because of Mr. 
Clark's conflict. 
Defendants argue that GLFP's view of Mr. Clark's conflict was an "after-
the-fact belief." Br. at 32. To the contrary, from the outset, GLFP alleged 
misconduct by Mr. Clark that clearly disqualified him from evaluating GLFP's 
claims. R. at 3-5. In any event, the trial court did not address this issue, instead 
1
 Note, however, that the trial court in Dansie, rather than dismissing the case at the 
outset, granted the plaintiffs leave to refile as derivative claims. 2006 UT 23, f 17, 
134P.3datll45. 
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ruling that the motion to amend was "moot". Defendants do not try to defend this 
ruling, which was clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
GLFP and the Learnings have been held hostage by the Clarks and 
CL Mgmt. Their claims - when considered in the context of closely-held, family 
limited partnerships - are a proper basis for ending that relationship. The district 
court's summary judgment should be reversed and this case remanded so that 
GLFP may pursue its claims, either directly or via an amended complaint. 
Dated this 6th day of November, 2006. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Brent E. Johnson, 7558 
Katherine Norman, 9573 
Holland & Hart LLP 
A. Bruce Jones, #11370 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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